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Newly emerging or ‘‘re-emerging’’ viral diseases continue to pose significant global public health threats.
Prototypic are influenza viruses that are major causes of human respiratory infections and mortality. Influenza
viruses can cause zoonotic infections and adapt to humans, leading to sustained transmission and emer-
gence of novel viruses. Mechanisms by which viruses evolve in one host, cause zoonotic infection, and adapt
to a new host species remain unelucidated. Here, we review the evolution of influenza A viruses in their reser-
voir hosts and discuss genetic changes associated with introduction of novel viruses into humans, leading to
pandemics and the establishment of seasonal viruses.Introduction
Zoonotic infections, in which a pathogen adapted to another
animal species causes disease in a human, may be sporadic,
dead-end infections without adaptation to humans (e.g., Ebola
and Hanta viruses). Other zoonotic infections can stably adapt
to humans, leading to sustained person-to-person transmission
(e.g., HIV and SARS). Influenza A viruses (IAVs) fall into this latter
category, in which multiple stable host switch events have been
reported. The mechanisms by which viruses stably adapt to new
host species, often distantly related, are still largely uneluci-
dated. Like IAVs, many of the viruses that have demonstrated
an ability to cause zoonotic infections and/or transmit between
host species have RNA genomes (Holmes, 2010).
With a low-fidelity viral RNA polymerase lacking exonuclease
proofreading capability and inherently high error rate, IAVs exist
as populations of quasispecies (Domingo et al., 1998). Random
mutations can be rapidly selected for or against, depending
upon the evolutionary pressures applied, including novel host
environment (Landolt and Olsen, 2007), response to pre-existing
immunity leading to antigenic drift (Smith et al., 2004), or antiviral
drug pressure leading to resistance (Ong and Hayden, 2007).
The major natural host species of IAVs include wild aquatic
waterfowl and shorebirds (Webster et al., 1992). IAVs have
been able to adapt stably to a wide variety of animals, including
avian and mammalian species, and novel human-adapted
IAVs have emerged to cause pandemics several times in the
last 100 years (Taubenberger and Morens, 2009). Each of the
viruses causing these pandemics has emerged in a different
way, making generalizations about zoonotic IAV adaptation to
humans difficult. As data have accumulated, it has become
clear that IAV host switch events are polygenic and represent
different solutions to the common problem of replication and
transmission in a host (Taubenberger and Morens, 2009). The
relative paucity of stable IAV host switch events from the avian
reservoir to humans and domestic animals further supports
the complexity of the process and severely limits our ability to
predict future emergence. Host switch/adaptation, transmissi-
bility, and pathogenicity/virulence are each complex multifacto-
rial interactions between virus and host and are likely under440 Cell Host & Microbe 7, June 17, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.independent selective pressures (Taubenberger and Morens,
2009).
Overview of Influenza Pandemics
Influenza viruses are among the most common causes of human
respiratory infections and among the most significant because
they cause high morbidity and mortality. Influenza outbreaks
have apparently occurred since at least the Middle Ages, if not
since ancient times (Taubenberger and Morens, 2009). In the
elderly, infants, and people with chronic diseases, influenza is
associated with especially high mortality. In the United States,
influenza results in approximately 200,000 hospitalizations
and 36,000 deaths in a typical endemic season. In addition to
annual winter outbreaks, pandemic IAVs occasionally emerge,
as they have every 8–41 years for at least several centuries.
IAV pandemics are global outbreaks due to viruses with novel
antigenic subtypes. Up to 50% of the population can be infected
in a single pandemic year and can be associated with a dramatic
increase in number of deaths.
In the last 500 years, since 1510, there have been approxi-
mately 14 IAV pandemics; in the past 120 years, there were
pandemics in 1889, 1918, 1957, 1968, 1977, and 2009 (Tauben-
berger and Morens, 2009). In 1918, the worst pandemic in
recorded history caused approximately 675,000 total deaths in
the United States and killed up to 50 million people worldwide
(Johnson and Mueller, 2002). The 1957 and 1968 pandemics
caused approximately 70,000 and 34,000 excess deaths in the
United States, respectively (Noble, 1982). While it is too early
to assess the full impact of the 2009 pandemic, in its first year,
there have been approximately 12,000 deaths in the United
States, of which the vast majority have been in individuals under
age 65.
Overview of the Biology of IAVs
Influenza viruses (family Orthomyxoviridae) are enveloped nega-
tive-strand RNA viruses with segmented genomes containing
7–8 gene segments. The five genera in the family include influen-
zavirus A, influenzavirus B, influenzavirus C, thogotovirus, and
isavirus (infectious salmon anemia virus) (Palese and Shaw,
Figure 1. Diagrammatic Representation of an Influenza A Virus
The two major surface glycoproteins, hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase
(NA), along with small numbers of the matrix 2 (M2) ion channel protein, are
embedded in a lipid bilayer. The matrix 1 (M1) protein underlies the envelope
and interacts with the surface proteins and also with the ribonucleoproteins
(RNPs). RNPs consist of the eight negative-stranded RNA segments and
nucleoprotein (NP) and the polymerase complex heterotrimer (PB2, PB1,
and PA). The nuclear export protein (NEP, or nonstructural protein 2, NS2) is
contained within the virion, but the nonstructural protein 1 (NS1) is not.
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in host range and pathogenicity and are likely to have diverged
evolutionarily at least several thousand years ago. Influenza A
and B viruses have a similar structure, whereas influenza C is
more divergent. Influenza A- and B-type viruses contain eight
discrete single-stranded RNA gene segments, each encoding
at least one protein. Only IAVs pose a significant risk of zoonotic
infection, host switch, and the generation of pandemic IAVs.
IAVs are enveloped with a host cell-derived lipid membrane.
The eight gene segments encode at least 11 open reading
frames (ORFs) (Figure 1). IAVs are covered with projections of
three proteins: hemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA), and
matrix 2 (M2). HA is a glycosylated type I integral membrane
protein with functions both as the viral receptor-binding protein
and fusion protein. The matrix 1 (M1) protein is found under the
membrane and interacts with cytoplasmic domains of the
surface glycoproteins and also with the viral ribonucleoprotein
(RNP) complexes. HA recognizes sialic acid (SA) (N-acetyl
neuraminic acid) bound to underlying sugars on the tips of
host cell glycoproteins. IAVs have HAs with different specific-
ities for the disaccharide consisting of SAs and the penultimate
sugar (galactose or N-Acetylgalactosamine [GalNAc]) with
different glycosidic bond isomerization. IAVs adapted to birds
have an HA receptor-binding specificity for a2-3 SA, while
HAs from IAVs adapted to humans have higher specificity for
a2-6 SA (see below). After binding its receptors, the virus is
internalized, and the acidic pH in the endosomal compartment
leads to a conformational change in HA, mediating fusion of
the viral and endosomal membranes, allowing release of viral
RNPs into the cytoplasm. Mature HA is a trimer, and each
monomer undergoes proteolytic cleavage to generate disul-
fide-bonded HA1 and HA2 polypeptide chains prior to activa-
tion. IAV requires exogenous serine proteases (trypsin-like
enzymes) for activation, recognizing a conserved Q/E-X-R motif
found at the HA cleavage site (Chen et al., 1998). In humans and
other mammals, this is likely to be the tryptase Clara produced
by cells of the bronchiolar epithelium. Cleavage activation of HA
likely requires similar proteases in avian intestinal and/or
respiratory cells. IAV of H5 and H7 subtypes can acquire inser-
tional mutations at the HA cleavage site, changing their protease
recognition site to a furin-like recognition sequence, R-X-R/K-R.
This polybasic cleavage site broadens protease specificity,
allowing intracellular cleavage activation and systemic replica-
tion, resulting in a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI).
Prototypic is the Eurasian lineage of H5N1 HPAI, which has
circulated widely in the last decade, causing high mortality
in domestic poultry as well as causing human infections and
death.
NA is a type II integral membrane glycoprotein with sialidase
enzymatic activity required for cleavage of both host cell SAs,
allowing release of newly produced virions, and SAs on viral
glycoproteins to prevent aggregation of nascent viral particles.
The complementary functions between SA binding by HA and
SA removal by NA likely require evolutionary coadaptation.
Both HA and NA are the major antigenic targets of the humoral
immune response to IAV, and NA is the target of the antiviral
drugs oseltamivir and zanamivir. The small proteinM2 is a proton
channel necessary for viral replication and is the target of the
adamantane class of antiviral drugs.Each IAV RNA segment is encapsidated by nucleoprotein
(NP). In virions, viral RNA are wrapped around NP monomers
and packaged into viral RNPs, along with the three polymerase
proteins (polymerase basic protein 2 [PB2], PB1 polymerase
basic protein 1 [PB1], and polymerase acidic protein [PA]).
The polymerase proteins form a heterotrimer bound to a short
hairpin structure formed by the partially complementary terminal
50 and 30 untranslated regions (UTRs) of each RNA segment. PB1
serves as the RNA-dependent RNA polymerase. PB2 functions
in mRNA synthesis by binding host mRNA caps. While PA
is necessary for a functional polymerase complex, including
endonucleolytic cleavage of host RNAs, its biological roles
remain poorly understood. It may have additional proteolytic
activity and may also act as an elongation factor during RNA
synthesis. NP acts primarily as a single-strand RNA-binding
protein and serves as the structural protein in the RNPs. In addi-
tion, it plays an important role in transcription and in the traf-
ficking of RNPs between the cytoplasm and nucleus. IAV RNA
transcription and replication occur in the host nucleus, since
IAV is dependent on the RNA processing machinery of the host
cell. The processes of being imported into the nucleus, exported
back out to the cytoplasm, and then prevented from re-entering
the nucleus also all appear to depend on the interaction of NP
with host proteins.
The nonstructural 1 (NS1) protein has multiple functional
domains, including N-terminal dsRNA binding (1–73) containing
a nuclear localization signal (NLS), a central effector domain
(73–207) containing a nuclear export signal, and a C-terminal
region (207–230) containingaPDZdomain (Hale et al., 2008).NS1
has pleiotropic functions, including dsRNA binding, enhance-
ment of viral mRNA translation, inhibition of host mRNA process-
ing, and type I interferon antagonism (Palese and Shaw, 2007).
The NS2 protein (also referred to as nuclear export protein,
NEP) is found in virions and facilitates nuclear export of viralCell Host & Microbe 7, June 17, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 441
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encoded within the PB1 gene by an alternative reading frame,
targets the mitochondrial inner membrane, and may play a role
in apoptosis during IAV infection. Recently, the PB1 gene has
also been reported to encode a third polypeptide expressed via
differential AUG codon usage, termed N40 (Wise et al., 2009).
Type B and C influenza viruses are adapted to and isolated
almost exclusively from humans, although influenza B viruses
have been isolated from seals and influenza C viruses have
been isolated from pigs and dogs (Wright et al., 2007). In
contrast, however, IAVs infect a wide variety of warm-blooded
animals, including birds, swine, horses, and humans. Avian IAV
in aquatic birds likely serves as the predominant natural reservoir
for all known subtypes and probably is the ultimate source of all
human pandemic IAV strains (Webster et al., 1992).
IAVs are subdivided by antigenic characterization of the HA
and NA surface glycoproteins. Sixteen HA and nine NA subtypes
are known, all of which have been isolated from avian hosts.
Theoretically, therefore, 144 possible HA-NA subtype combina-
tions are possible, and IAVs expressing at least 116 of these
subtype combinations have been isolated in birds (Krauss
et al., 2004; Munster et al., 2007). World Health Organization
guidelines for the nomenclature of influenza viruses are as
follows. First, the type of virus is designated (A, B, or C), then
the host (if nonhuman), place of isolation, isolation number,
and year of isolation (separated by slashes). For IAV, HA (H1–
H16) and NA (N1–N9) subtypes are noted in parentheses. For
example, strains included in the most recent trivalent vaccine
for the 2010–2011 season in the United States are: A/Califor-
nia/7/2009 (H1N1), A/Perth/16/2009 (H3N2), and B/Brisbane/
60/2008.
Antigenic Drift and Antigenic Shift
IAVs are evolutionarily dynamic viruses and have high mutation
rates (ranging from approximately 1 3 103 to 8 3 103 substi-
tutions per site per year) (Chen and Holmes, 2006). Mutations
that change amino acids in the antigenic portions of the surface
glycoproteins HA and NA may produce selective advantages for
viral strains by allowing them to evade pre-existing immunity.
This is especially important in IAVs adapted to humans, which
are subjected to strong population immunologic pressures.
Antibodies against the HA protein prevent receptor binding,
can be neutralizing, and are effective at preventing reinfection
with the same strain (Murphy and Clements, 1989). Such selec-
tivemutation in themapped antigenic domains of HA and NA has
been termed antigenic drift.
Because the IAV genome consists of eight discrete RNA
segments, coinfection of one host cell with two different IAVs
can result in progeny viruses containing gene segments of
both parental viruses. When this process of genetic reassort-
ment involves the gene segments encoding the HA and/or NA
genes it has been termed antigenic shift. There are theoretically
256 (28) possible combinations of the eight gene segments from
reassortment between two parental viruses. Reassortment has
been shown to be both common and important in IAV evolution
(Dugan et al., 2008; Holmes et al., 2005) and host switch events
(Garten et al., 2009; Scholtissek et al., 1978). Homologous
recombination is not common in negative-sense RNA viruses
like IAV (Boni et al., 2008), but recombination by template switch-442 Cell Host & Microbe 7, June 17, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.ing has been described and has played a role in changing the
virulence or fitness of some IAVs (Wright et al., 2007).
IAVs in Wild Birds
Genetically and antigenically diverse IAVs are widely distributed
in wild avian species around the world. They are maintained
predominantly by asymptomatic infections (termed low patho-
genic avian influenza [LPAI]), most frequently documented in
aquatic birds of the orders Anseriformes (ducks, geese, swans,
etc.) and Charadriiformes (gulls, terns, etc.). At least 105 species
of wild birds have been identified as harboring IAVs (Munster
et al., 2007). IAVs in wild aquatic birds tend to be predominantly
transmitted via a fecal-oral route and to infect epithelial cells in
the lower intestinal tract, where they cause little to no apparent
disease.
The distribution of HA and NA subtypes is not uniform among
wild bird IAV isolates, with some HA subtypes being more
common than others. While most HA subtypes have been iso-
lated from the Anseriformes, HA subtypes H13 and H16 have
been isolated predominantly from Charadriiformes (Munster
et al., 2007). IAVs have been isolated from other orders of birds
(e.g., the large order Passeriformes, containing over half the
bird species), but most surveillance efforts have focused on
Anseriformes (aquatic waterfowl) and to a lesser extent Chara-
driiformes (shorebirds) because of the high prevalence of IAV
infection in these species, especially in dabbling ducks. There
are little available data to assess whether particular IAV subtypes
or strains possess adaptations to particular wild bird host
species outside of the observation that IAVs with H13 and H16
HA subtypes are isolated predominantly from gulls. Ecological
differences, like differences in feeding behavior, geographic
localization, and migratory patterns, likely all play roles in the
complex ecobiology of IAV in birds.
Two evolutionary models can explain the global pattern of IAV
diversity in wild birds, analogous to the allopatric and sympatric
models of speciation, and it is likely that both have played roles in
IAV evolution in wild birds (Dugan et al., 2008). Phylogenetic
analyses demonstrate that while all IAV HA subtypes had a
common ancestor, the HA subtypes did not originate in a single
radiation and include higher-order clustering. Intersubtype
genetic diversity is high, but intrasubtype diversity is quite low.
Hence, the genetic structure of avian IAV HA is characterized
by highly divergent subtypes that harbor relatively little internal
genetic diversity. This is also the case for the evolution of the
nine NA subtypes. Interestingly, analyses suggest that this diver-
sity reflects a very recent origin, with ranges for the most recent
common ancestors (TMRCAs) of the different HA subtypes in the
period of the last several hundred years (Chen and Holmes,
2010). The NS gene segment in bird IAV is characterized by
a deep divergence between the A and B alleles, strongly sug-
gesting that the two alleles are subject to some form of balancing
selection (Dugan et al., 2008). Far less genetic diversity is
observed in the five remaining IAV gene segments in wild birds
(PB2, PB1, PA, NP, and M). Phylogenetic analyses also reveal
a clear separation of avian IAV sequences from eastern and
western hemispheres, supporting allopatric evolutionary pres-
sures (Dugan et al., 2008; Munster and Fouchier, 2009). Mixed
infection and reassortment has also been shown to be extremely
common in IAVs in wild birds (Wang et al., 2008) with little
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number of different HA-NA subtype combinations recovered
also highlights the frequency of reassortment in avian IAVs
and provides little evidence for the elevated fitness of specific
HA-NA combinations. In contrast to the extensive genetic diver-
sity seen in HA, NA, and NS, the five remaining internal gene
segments encode proteins that are highly conserved at the
amino acid level, indicating that they are subject to widespread
purifying selection. The fitness landscape for these genes is
therefore not determined by cross-immunity but by functional
viability, with less selective pressure to fix advantageous muta-
tions. Given such strong conservation of amino acid sequence,
large-scale reassortment likely involves the exchange of func-
tionally equivalent segments, with little impact on overall fitness.
Dugan et al. hypothesized that IAV in wild birds exists as a large
pool of functionally equivalent and so often interchangeable
gene segments that form transient genome constellations,
without the strong selective pressure to be maintained as linked
genomes (Dugan et al., 2008).
IAVsmaintained in wild birds have been associated with stable
host switch events to novel hosts, including domestic gallina-
ceous poultry, horses, swine, and humans, leading to the emer-
gence of viral lineages transmissible in the new host. Adaptation
to domestic poultry species is the most frequent (Wright et al.,
2007). Stable host switching likely involves the acquisition of
a number of mutations, depending on the virus and the species,
that serve to separate an individual clonally derived IAV strain
from the large wild bird IAV gene pool. Because adaptation to
a new host likely limits the ability of these viruses to return to
the wild bird IAV gene pool (Swayne, 2007), these emergent
viruses must evolve as distinct eight-segment genome constel-
lations within the new host (Dugan et al., 2008; Taubenberger
and Morens, 2009).
IAVs in Domestic Galliform Poultry
Domesticated birds of the order Galliformes (e.g., turkeys,
chickens, quails, etc.) are not a reservoir host of avian IAV, but
are nonetheless susceptible to infection with wild-bird-derived
IAV after adaptation. Once IAVs are adapted to gallinaceous
poultry, they rarely circulate in the wild bird IAV viral pool
(Swayne, 2007). A dramatic exception to this trend is the recent
Eurasian-lineage HPAI H5N1 viruses that have been isolated in
wild bird populations in Europe and Asia.
The molecular features of host adaptation to domestic gallina-
ceous poultry are not yet fully elucidated, but include positive
selection for mutations in both HA and NA (Campitelli et al.,
2004; Perez et al., 2003) and viral RNP proteins (Wasilenko
et al., 2008). IAVs isolated from domestic poultry generally
maintain an HA receptor-binding specificity for a2-3 SA (Wright
et al., 2007). Another characteristic feature of poultry-adapted
IAV is an in-frame deletion of approximately 20 amino acids
from the stalk region of the NA (Blok and Air, 1982). NA stalk
deletion has been associated with reduced enzymatic activity
of the NA (Baigent and McCauley, 2001) and may be a compen-
satory adaptive change to reduced HA receptor-binding activity
of wild bird IAV adapted to replicate in the respiratory tract of
poultry.
Sporadically, strains of poultry-adapted H5 or H7 IAV evolve
into HPAI, usually through acquisition of an insertional mutation,resulting in a polybasic amino acid cleavage site within the HA
(Wright et al., 2007). The current Asian-lineage HPAI H5N1 pan-
zootic appears to be unique in the era of modern influenza
virology (Webster et al., 2007), resulting in the deaths of millions
of poultry in 64 countries on three continents, either from infec-
tion or culling. There are also significant zoonotic implications
of this panzootic, with 498 documented cases in humans, result-
ing in 294 deaths in 15 countries since 2003 as of May 2010.
IAVs in Mammals
IAVs have been isolated from numerous mammalian host
species, including humans, domestic pigs, horses, and dogs,
as well as such diverse hosts as pinnipeds (seals), cetaceans
(toothed whales), mink, and anteaters, among others (Landolt
and Olsen, 2007). Phylogenetic evidence suggests that all
mammalian IAV strains ultimately derive from the avian IAV
pool (Wright et al., 2007). IAV strains have been consistently
isolated from pigs and horses, but only sporadically from other
domestic and wild mammals. It is unclear if there are stable
wild mammalian IAV hosts or if occasional zoonotic infections
leads to localized outbreaks that do not persist. Only additional
surveillance can answer this question.
IAV in Swine
Swine IAV was first clinically detected in 1918 in association with
the 1918 pandemic (Taubenberger et al., 2001), and it is unclear if
IAV infections in swine occurred prior to that time. Since then,
swine IAV has been continuously recognized and is a disease
of major economic and public health importance (Landolt and
Olsen, 2007). IAVs of a number of subtypes have been isolated
from swine globally, a few causing enzootic infections and
many causing only limited outbreaks without continued circula-
tion. Since the isolation of the first IAV by Shope from pigs in
the 1930s, these ‘‘classical’’ swine H1N1 viruses, likely derived
from the 1918 pandemic IAV (Taubenberger et al., 2001), caused
enzootic seasonal disease in pigs in North America and world-
wide (Reperant et al., 2009). From 1998, several different line-
ages of ‘‘triple’’ reassortant viruses of H3N2, H1N2, and H1N1
subtypes, containing genes from the classical swine H1N1,
human H3N2, and avian IAVs, emerged to cause enzootic
disease in pigs in the U.S. and globally (Olsen, 2002). In Europe,
a novel lineage of H1N1 emerged in the late 1970s by adaptation
of an avian IAV to swine, leading to enzootic disease in Eurasia
(Dunham et al., 2009; Pensaert et al., 1981). Other fully avian or
fully human IAV-derived isolates or reassortant viruses contain-
ing genes of avian, swine, and/or human IAV origin have been
associated with less widespread disease in swine (Reperant
et al., 2009).
Since swine have been shown to be susceptible to infection
with both avian and human IAV strains, this host species has
been considered a prime ‘‘mixing vessel’’ or intermediate host
for the generation of IAVs of pandemic potential to humans
(Webster et al., 1992). This dual susceptibility has been associ-
ated with the presence of both a2-3 and a2-6 SA linkages on
the glycocalyx of epithelial cells lining the pig trachea, but recent
lectin histochemistry studies have shown little a2-3 SA in the
nasal, tracheal, and bronchial epithelium (Van Poucke et al.,
2010), with a SA receptor pattern not unlike the human respira-
tory tree (Nicholls et al., 2007). These data, along with evidence
of limited replication and transmission of avian IAV in swine,Cell Host & Microbe 7, June 17, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 443
Figure 2. Genetic Relationships between Human and Relevant Swine Influenza Viruses, 1918–2009
Gray arrows reflect derivation of one or more gene segments from the avian IAV gene pool (although the timing and mechanism of emergence in each case
remains unknown). The dashed red arrow indicates a period without circulation of H1N1 in humans. Solid red arrows indicate the evolutionary paths of human
IAV lineages; solid black arrows, of swine IAV lineages; and the black-to-red arrow, of the swine-origin 2009 human H1N1 pandemic IAV. IAVs contain eight gene
segments (as shown in Figure 1). The dashed, descending black arrows reflect human zoonotic infections with swine IAVs. Figure is modified from (Morens et al.,
2009).
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avian-to-mammalian host switch events. Clearly, changes in HA
receptor-binding specificity play a significant role, but the
constellation of genes that control efficient replication and trans-
mission in the new host is also vitally important.
IAV in Horses
Unlike swine IAV, equine IAV has been recognized for hundreds
of years (Taubenberger andMorens, 2009): interestingly, often in
close association with human IAV epidemics or pandemics.
In the virologic era, the first IAV isolated from horses occurred
in an epizootic (an outbreak in animals) in 1956. This lineage of
equine H7N7 is now likely extinct, but an H3N8 equine IAV
lineage first detected in the early 1960s continues to circulate
enzootically (endemically in animals) and cause a high disease
and economic burden on the horse industry. In 1989, an
independent, avian-like H3N8 virus was isolated following an
epizootic in horses in China, but this lineage has not persisted.
Available phylogenetic evidence suggests that all these equine
lineages were derived from avian IAV (Horimoto and Kawaoka,
2001).444 Cell Host & Microbe 7, June 17, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.IAVs in Humans
Our understanding of pandemic IAV at the viral level is limited.
Pandemic viruses have been isolated from 1957 onward, and
the 1918 pandemic virus was reconstructed using an ‘‘archae-
virologic’’ approach (Taubenberger et al., 2007), but we do not
yet know the subtypes or genetic makeup of the pandemics
before 1918. All the pandemic viruses since 1918 contain gene
segments derived from the 1918 virus (Figure 2), and conse-
quently, it may be considered that the past 91 years are part of
a larger ‘‘pandemic era’’ (Morens et al., 2009).
The 1918–1919 Pandemic Virus
The ‘‘Spanish’’ influenza pandemic killed an estimated 50 million
or more people (Johnson and Mueller, 2002). Reconstruction of
the viral genome from the tissues of several victims has demon-
strated that the causative agent was an avian-descended H1N1
virus (Rabadan et al., 2006; Taubenberger et al., 2005). As no
human pre-1918 IAV sequences are currently available, the
origin of the pandemic virus, including timing of its emergence
in humans and whether an intermediate host was involved,
remains unresolved (Smith et al., 2009a). The high mortality
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of bacterial pneumonia, but the copathogenic mechanisms
responsible for such fatal bacterial diseases remain unknown
(Morens et al., 2008). Epidemiological features of the pandemic
were also unprecedented, including its appearance in up to three
waves within the first year and a ‘‘W-shaped’’ (trimodal) age-
specific mortality curve that featured an unexplained peak in
healthy young adults.
By about 1920, the virus began to circulate in a pattern of
seasonal endemic recurrences, and it remained so as it ‘‘drifted’’
antigenically for nearly 40 years. When the next pandemic
appeared in 1957, the H1N1 virus disappeared from circulation.
However, 20 years later, in 1977, it returned to circulation and
caused a (low-grade) pandemic that disproportionately affected
persons of less than 20 years old. The 1918 H1N1-lineage IAV
continues to cocirculate globally today, along with H3N2 IAV
descended from the 1968 pandemic and. since 2009, with the
new H1N1 pandemic virus. It is remarkable not only that direct
(all-eight-gene segment) descendants of the 1918 virus still
circulate in humans as epidemic H1N1 viruses and in epizootic
form as classical swine H1N1 viruses, but that for the past 50
years the original virus and its progeny have continually donated
genes to new viruses to cause new pandemics, epidemics, and
epizootics (Figure 2). The novel H1N1 virus associated with the
ongoing 2009 pandemic is a fourth-generation descendant of
the 1918 virus (Morens et al., 2009).
The 1957–1958 Pandemic Virus
The H2N2 ‘‘Asian’’ pandemic virus that emerged in 1957 was
a lineal descendant of the 1918 H1N1 pandemic virus that
acquired three novel gene segments by reassortment with an
unknown avian virus. The gene segments encoding HA and NA
were replaced by an avian-like H2 subtype HA and an N2
subtype NA (Scholtissek et al., 1978), respectively, with the other
five gene segments retained from the 1918-derived H1N1
lineage. The gene segment encoding the PB1 polymerase was
also replaced with an avian-like gene segment (Kawaoka et al.,
1989). Even though this pandemic occurred in an era when
experimental influenza virology was active, identity of the host
in which reassortment event(s) occurred remains unknown. It is
also not known how long it took from the initial reassortment
event(s) for the virus to evolve into the efficiently transmissible,
human-adapted IAV that caused the pandemic. Its pathology
and clinical appearance were similar or identical to those of
the 1918 virus, although the unusual epidemiologic features of
the 1918 pandemic noted above were not seen in 1957. As
was true for the 1918 pandemic, after about two years the virus
became seasonally endemic and sporadic, disappearing entirely
within 11 years. To date, it has not returned.
The 1968 Pandemic Virus
Like the pandemic that preceded it, the 1968 H3N2 ‘‘Hong
Kong’’ pandemic was caused by a reassortment event between
a circulating human H2N2 virus and an avian IAV, acquiring novel
HA (H3 subtype) and PB1 gene segments (Kawaoka et al., 1989;
Scholtissek et al., 1978). The other six gene segments, including
the NA gene segment, were retained from the 1957 H2N2 virus
(including five segments—PB2, PA, NP, M, and NS—retained
from the 1918 H1N1 lineage). Antibodies to NA, while not pre-
venting infection, have been shown to reduce the duration and
severity of illness. It has been suggested that the relative mild-ness of the 1968 pandemic was the result of the retention of
the previously circulating N2 NA (Kilbourne, 1997). The 1968
pandemic was so mild in its mortality impact that in some loca-
tions, fewer deaths occurred than in certain nonpandemic years
(Morens et al., 2009). As had been the case in 1957, the virus
quickly became endemic and seasonal in its appearance and
has now circulated globally for 42 years. Paradoxically, the
morbidity and mortality burden of antigenic drift variants of the
H3N2 lineage over the past decades has been very high (Morens
et al., 2009). With the emergence of the novel H1N1 pandemic in
2009, little evidence of H3N2 circulation was noted. However, as
of May 2010, H3N2 continues to be isolated at low levels around
the world.
The 1977–1978 Pandemic Virus
The re-emergence in 1977 of a descendant of the 1918 H1N1
virus that had been absent from circulation for 20 years consti-
tutes a pandemic by definition, but it is usually regarded as
a ‘‘technical’’ pandemic that represents an unusual coda to the
1918 pandemic. It is curious that the same virus that disap-
peared on its own in 1957 has, after reintroduction, been able
to survive for over 30 years in the face of immunity pressures
thought to be as great or greater than those associated with its
disappearance (i.e., high population immunity from natural infec-
tion and additional immunity from annual vaccination, which is
much more common now than it was in 1957). It is considered
unlikely that human IAVs could have been maintained in nature
for 20 years without accumulating mutations, suggesting that
the 1977 epidemic resulted from the release of a frozen strain
from the 1950s. Molecular genetic analyses confirmed that the
1977 strain was very similar to early 1950s H1N1 strains in all
eight gene segments (Nakajima et al., 1978). The H3N2 and
H1N1 viruses cocirculated endemically for over 30 years in the
face of high population immunity (Rambaut et al., 2008). Coinfec-
tion with both subtypes has been reported, together with the
circulation of occasional reassortant H1N2 viruses. Like H3N2,
seasonal H1N1 also continues to be isolated at low levels (as
of May 2010) despite the emergence of the novel 2009 H1N1
virus. Whether seasonal H3N2 and/or H1N1 viruses will continue
circulate along with derivatives of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus
is unknown.
The 2009–2010 Pandemic Virus
The current pandemic, caused by a novel H1N1 virus derived
from two unrelated swine H1N1 viruses (Garten et al., 2009),
one of them a ‘‘classical’’ swine derivative of the 1918 human
virus and the other the European avian-like H1N1 lineage
(Dunham et al., 2009), adds to the complexity of pandemic virus
emergence (Figure 2). The current H1N1 pandemic derived its
NA and M gene segments from the European avian-like H1N1
lineage and its remaining six gene segments (PB2, PB1, PA,
HA, NP, and NS) from the North American swine H1N2 ‘‘triple’’
reassortant lineage. The HA, NP, and NS gene segments of
this lineage are derived from the classical swine H1N1 (1918
origin) lineage, while the polymerase gene segments have
different origins: PB2 and PA were derived from an avian IAV
source and PB1 from a human seasonal H3N2 virus when the
‘‘triple’’ reassortant swine lineage emerged in the late 1990s
(Smith et al., 2009b). Despite the recent explosion in IAV surveil-
lance and gene sequencing, we do not know when and where
the novel pandemic virus originated or the species in which theCell Host & Microbe 7, June 17, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 445
Cell Host & Microbe
Reviewreassortment event took place, although evolution in swine is
a favored hypothesis. TMRCA analyses suggest that the
pandemic virus was circulating in humans for at least several
months prior to its detection in early 2009 (Smith et al., 2009b).
IAV Host Switch Events
Avian-to-Mammalian Host Switch Events
The mechanisms by which avian IAVs cross species barriers to
infect humans or other mammals, either causing dead-end
infections or leading to subsequent transmission in the novel
mammalian host, are unknown. Moreover, the properties of
IAVs that have the greatest medical and public health relevance,
such as human infectivity, transmissibility, and pathogenicity,
appear to be complex and polygenic and are poorly understood
(Parrish et al., 2008; Taubenberger and Morens, 2009).
Avian IAV Infections in Swine and Horses
Although a number of fully avian IAVs (without reassortment with
a human or swine IAV) of various subtypes have been isolated
from swine populations globally (Brown, 2000), most of these
transmission events have been self-limited and not led to stable,
long-term circulation of novel swine-adapted IAVs. The Euro-
pean avian-like lineage of swine H1N1 is an important exception,
having circulated in swine since the late 1970s (Dunham et al.,
2009) and also playing a role in the emergence of the 2009
pandemic H1N1 lineage (Garten et al., 2009). Both of the stable
equine IAV lineages are thought to have derived from avian sour-
ces, and an epizootic of an avian-derived H3N8 virus was
detected in horses in China in 1989.
Avian IAV Infections in Humans
In the past decade, a large number of documented zoonotic
avian IAV infections of humans have occurred, predominantly
in association with HPAI epizootics of H5N1 in Eurasia and Africa
(Peiris et al., 2007) and in smaller epizootics with H7N7 HPAI in
the Netherlands (Fouchier et al., 2004), H7N3 HPAI in Canada
(Tweed et al., 2004), and LPAI infections with H9N2 (Lin et al.,
2000), all without evidence of stable adaptation or sustained
human-to-human transmission. Prior to this, there was limited
evidence of direct avian-to-human IAV exposure, based on a
small number of experimental human volunteer infections with
LPAI (Beare and Webster, 1991) or by serological surveillance
(Malik Peiris, 2009).
H5N1 Infections
The continuing spread of H5N1 HPAI viruses into poultry popu-
lations on several continents, associated with a growing number
of human zoonotic infections, has been associated with intense
public health interest and concern for a future pandemic (Wright
et al., 2007). H5N1 HPAI viruses initially caused a 1996 poultry
epizootic in southern China, followed within a year by an epizo-
otic in Hong Kong that produced 18 human cases and six deaths
(Claas et al., 1998; Subbarao et al., 1998). H5N1 strains con-
tinued to circulate thereafter in China, and they reappeared in
epizootic form in 2003 and spread widely thereafter. Evidence
suggests that H5N1 viruses are evolving rapidly; however, the
direction of this evolution, which is driven by incompletely under-
stood selection pressures, is unclear. While current strains of
Southeast Asian H5N1 HPAI viruses are descendants of the
1996 Chinese epizootic virus, significant genetic and antigenic
evolution has since occurred (Guan et al., 2004), involving anti-
genic drift in the H5 HA, mutations in other genes, and reassort-446 Cell Host & Microbe 7, June 17, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.ment with other avian IAVs (Chen et al., 2006). It is not yet clear
which of these many changes are associated with lethality in
wild birds or with pathogenicity and transmissibility in poultry
or other species. At the same time, adaptation of H5N1 HPAI
strains associated with asymptomatic, endemic infection of
domestic ducks is probably contributing to continuing spillover
into poultry, leading to the maintenance of a pool of pathogenic
viruses to which humans will be continually exposed (Sturm-
Ramirez et al., 2005). Nevertheless, there are limited data relating
to whether or not any H5N1 IAV strain is evolving in the direction
of human adaptation.
Avian H7 and H9 Subtype Infections
Although overshadowed by the spread of H5N1, during the
past decade at least eight other major poultry epizootics have
occurred, caused either by emergence of novel H5 or H7 sub-
type HPAI viruses unrelated to Asian H5N1 viruses or, in one
case, by an H9N2 LPAI virus (Alexander, 2007). Some of these
epizootics have featured human infections with few human
deaths. Since themid-1990s, strains of H9N2 LPAI have become
enzootic in domestic poultry populations on several continents
(Alexander, 2007), leading to a small number of human infec-
tions. Like H5N1, different genetic lineages of H9N2 have been
established, some of which share with H5N1 viruses closely
related internal gene segments. Some H9N2 viruses have even
acquired enhanced specificity for the human form of the HA
receptor (Matrosovich et al., 2001). In 2003, an H7N7 HPAI virus
caused a poultry epizootic in the Netherlands and spread region-
ally. Before the epizootic was contained, at least 86 poultry
workers and three of their contacts had become infected and
developed conjunctivitis with or without an influenza-like illness;
one of them died (Fouchier et al., 2004). Similarly, two persons
developed influenza conjunctivitis during an outbreak of H7N3
HPAI in Canada in 2004 (Tweed et al., 2004). The H5N1 epizo-
otics are unique, however, in causing infections and deaths in
a large number of wild bird species (Alexander, 2007), occasional
infections in wild and domestic mammals, severe and fatal
human spillover infections (Peiris et al., 2007), and in rare
instances, limited human-to-human transmission.
Mammalian-to-Mammalian Host Switch Events
The historical medical literature frequently described equine IAV
epizootics in relation to IAV epidemics in humans (Taubenberger
and Morens, 2009) but also to IAV infections in dogs. Recently,
equine H3N8 viruses have adapted to dogs in a stable host
switch event (Crawford et al., 2005), where they are now evolving
by antigenic drift. Equine H3N8 viruses were also recently iso-
lated from pigs in China, without evidence of stable host switch
(Tu et al., 2009).
Swine-adapted IAVs have also been associated with zoonotic
infections in humans, with 37 documented cases between 1958
and 2005 with several reported fatalities (Myers et al., 2007),
including an outbreak of classical swine H1N1 infection in
soldiers at Fort Dix, NJ, in 1976 (Gaydos et al., 2006) with one
death. The ability of a swine-adapted IAV to result in a stable
host switch event to humans was proven only with the emer-
gence of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus (Garten et al., 2009;
Smith et al., 2009b). It is not known why zoonotic infection with
previous swine-adapted IAV strains, including the 1976 Fort
Dix strain (Kilbourne, 2006) in which human-to-human transmis-
sion was demonstrated, did not result in a stable host switch and
Cell Host & Microbe
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Reeth and Nicoll, 2009).
Molecular Correlates of Human Adaptation
Despite significant research, fundamental questions about how
IAVs switch hosts remain unanswered. Also poorly understood
are the viral genetic changes that underlie human adaptation,
human-to-human transmissibility, and pathogenesis. Biological
barriers to the fitness of viruses with various gene segment
combinations are still poorly understood; however, virulence/
pathogenicity, host adaptation, and host-to-host transmissibility
are likely independent properties that are associated with
different and possibly competingmutations. The role of virulence
and pathogenicity in virus-host relationships is therefore unclear;
pandemic viruses of comparatively low (e.g., 1968 and 2009),
intermediate (e.g., 1889 and 1957), and high (e.g., 1918) patho-
genicity have all adapted to humans and exhibited efficient
transmissibility.
Another complicating factor stems from the fact that 5 of the 8
gene segments introduced with the 1918 IAVs (PB2, PA, NP, M,
and NS) were retained in the reassortment events leading to the
1957 H2N2 and 1968 H3N2 pandemics (Figure 2) and thus have
circulated continuously in both pandemic and seasonal human
H1N1, H2N2, and H3N2 IAVs from 1918 to 2010 (Morens et al.,
2009). A number of groups have performed comparative anal-
yses to propose mutations that are signatures of human IAV
adaptation (Finkelstein et al., 2007; Taubenberger et al., 2005)
that relate back to this single host switch event in 1918. Exami-
nation of independent avian-to-mammalian host switch events,
however, suggests a lack of parallel evolution (Dunham et al.,
2009). The unexpected emergence of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic
virus further supports the independent and polygenic nature of
these host adaptation events in IAV (Herfst et al., 2010; Jagger
et al., 2010; Mehle and Doudna, 2009).
Changes in IAV Genome GC Content
Rabadan and colleagues have shown that avian-origin IAVs have
a higher GC content than IAVs adapted to humans (Greenbaum
et al., 2008; Rabadan et al., 2006). Gene segments from the 1918
pandemic demonstrated a nucleotide composition and guanine-
cytosine (GC) content similar to avian IAV, supporting an ultimate
avian origin for this pandemic virus (Rabadan et al., 2006). Similar
changes in nucleotide composition with a decline in GC content
were also shown for swine-adapted IAV (Dunham et al., 2009).
The biological basis for these observations is not yet clear,
but hypotheses include core temperature differences (with
higher core temperatures in avian hosts), a mutational bias in
the cellular components needed for RNA replication (Rabadan
et al., 2006), a human defense mechanism against RNA viruses
operating functionally analogous to the Apobec family of deam-
inases against HIV infection, or avoidance of immune detection
by mimicry of host mRNA composition (Greenbaum et al., 2008).
HA Receptor-Binding Specificity
IAV infection is initiated by viral attachment mediated by HA
proteins binding to SA-bearing cell surface receptors. The
binding interactions are very weak, and high avidity is achieved
by binding interactions between multiple HA molecules on the
virus and the SA receptors on the target cell (Matrosovich
et al., 2009). HA glycoproteins bind to certain SA isomers on
the tips of host glycoproteins, strongly supporting a role for HAbinding to SA in determining host range (Nicholls et al., 2007;
Taubenberger, 2006).
The HA receptor-binding domain (RBD) is conserved in avian
HAs, but those IAVs adapted to humans have mutations in
several key residues of the RBD, including sites 138, 190, 194,
225, 226, and 228 (H3 numbering) (Wright et al., 2007). It is
thought that mutations at these sites increase binding from
a2-3 to a2-6 SA. For H1-subtype IAV adapting to humans or
swine, E190D and G225D (H3 numbering) were shown to be
crucial changes for enhanced a2-6 binding, while for H2- and
H3-subtype HAs, Q226L was shown to be crucial (Wright et al.,
2007). IAV with H13 and H16 HA subtypes have been isolated
from gulls rather than ducks, and this may reflect a host adapta-
tion, as both H13 and H16 HAs bear mutations in the RBD
(Matrosovich et al., 2009). The HA RBD requirements for host
switch have been further complicated by recent studies. The
majority of H5N1 virus infections have occurred in viruses with
RBD specificity for a2-3 SA, although some isolates have
acquired mutations giving them enhanced a2-6 SA binding
(Wright et al., 2007). Some avian IAV of H7N2, H7N3 (Belser
et al., 2008), and H9N2 subtypes (Matrosovich et al., 2001)
have shown enhanced specificity for a2-6 SA and yet have
only caused occasional zoonotic infections in humans.
Sequence analysis of 1918 pandemic HA (directly from clinical
material) has shown that isolates differed at HA residue 225
(with three cases having the human aspartic acid and two cases
retaining the avian glycine) (Reid et al., 2003). Glycan array and
structural analyses (Chandrasekaran et al., 2008; Stevens
et al., 2006) showed that the 1918 variant with a glycine at 225
had a blended a2-3/a2-6 SA-binding specificity while those
sequences with an aspartic acid at 225 had a a2-6 SA-binding
specificity, yet there was no appreciable difference in clinical
course or autopsy findings between the cases (Reid et al.,
2003). Clearly, enhanced binding to a2-6 SA is not in itself
adequate for host switch of an avian-adapted IAV to humans,
nor is it a requirement for human infections. IAVs bearing the
1918 HA with different RBD configurations (a2-3, a2-6, and
blended a2-3/a2-6 specificities) were all shown to be virulent
in mice (Qi et al., 2009) and ferrets, but viral constructs with
the 1918 HA having only a2-3 specificity did not transmit
between ferrets (Tumpey et al., 2007). Interestingly, 2009 H1N1
pandemic viruses with variable amino acids at the 225 site
have also been isolated.
Clearly, a number of fundamental questions remain unan-
swered. Structural studies have shown that it is inadequate to
consider only the linkage of the terminal SA in regard to deter-
mining the specificity of different IAV HAs. What is the distribu-
tion of these diverse glycans on the respiratory tree? How
much variability in expression patterns is observed between indi-
viduals, or are there changes in glycan expression with age or
other physiological states? What about HA subtypes other
than H1–H3? Several mutations have been reported to enhance
the binding of H5 to a2-6, but fixation of such mutations has not
occurred after at least 11 years of exposure of thousands of
humans to H5N1, suggesting that changes in HA RBD during
host adaptation are extremely complex and must differ from
subtype to subtype (Ayora-Talavera et al., 2009).
The HA of H5 or H7HPAI viruses with a polybasic cleavage site
serves as a primary virulence factor in poultry. The HA of theCell Host & Microbe 7, June 17, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 447
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but nonetheless has been shown to be a virulence factor in
mammalian models (Kash et al., 2004, 2006; Kobasa et al.,
2004). There is no evidence, however, linking HA virulence in
a mammalian model either with or without a polybasic cleavage
site with host adaptation.
IAV RNP Complex
Changes in the constellations of gene segments as well as muta-
tions in the RNP genes have been long implicated in the adapta-
tion of avian IAV to humans (Wright et al., 2007). The PB1 gene
segment was shown to be very avian IAV-like in the 1918 virus
(Taubenberger et al., 2005) and was replaced by reassortment
with an avian IAV in the 1957 and 1968 pandemics (Wright
et al., 2007). These reassortment events suggest that an avian
IAV-derived PB1 segment can function in an otherwise mamma-
lian-adapted IAV without prior adaptation, as has been shown
experimentally. The PB1-F2 protein encoded from a +1 ORF
within the PB1ORF (Chen et al., 2001) is highly variable in coding
sequence in wild bird IAV (Holmes et al., 2006) and is also varia-
bly encoded in human and swine IAV. Mutations in PB1-F2 have
been mapped as virulence factors in the 1918 virus and in some
H5N1HPAI viruses (Conenello et al., 2007), but there are no clear
data linking PB1-F2 with host adaptation (Taubenberger et al.,
2005). The PA and NP proteins have been associated with host
restriction, and a number of mutations have been proposed for
human adaptation (Wright et al., 2007). However, further exper-
imental data mapping the host range restriction associated with
specific mutations are needed.
The PB2 gene segment, and in particular PB2 residue 627,
has been identified as an important determinant of host range
restriction (Subbarao et al., 1993) and virulence in animalmodels.
Avian IAVs generally encode glutamine at this site, while human
isolates from 1918–2009 typically encoded lysine. Residues
701–702, residing in a region of PB2 implicated in nuclear locali-
zation (Gabriel et al., 2008; Tarendeau et al., 2007), have similarly
been identified as a host-adaptive locus (Gabriel et al., 2005),
with the D701N mutation increasing both replication in mice
(Li et al., 2005) and transmission in guinea pigs (Steel et al.,
2009). Independent examples of selection of the PB2 D701N
mutation have also been observed, for example, in the nonpan-
demic avian-origin European swine H1N1 viruses (Dunham
et al., 2009), as well as in someHPAI H5N1 viruses. Several other
PB2 mutations have been proposed to play a role in human
adaptation (Taubenberger et al., 2005), but notably, the 2009
H1N1 pandemic virus PB2 (derived independently of the 1918
host switch event) shows little evidence of parallel evolution.
For example, Finkelstein et al. proposed ten amino acid changes
in PB2 as persistent human IAV host markers, but the 2009
pandemic virus only shares one, T271A. This change was,
however, not present in the 1918 pandemic virus and thus was
likely not required for human adaptation.
There has been concern that if the 2009 pandemic virus
acquired some of these previously identified human IAV-associ-
ated changes, it might increase its virulence or transmissibility
(Herfst et al., 2010; Jagger et al., 2010; Mehle and Doudna,
2009). Herfst et al. and Jagger et al. recently showed no
enhanced replication or virulence when the E627K or D701N
was added to viruses bearing the 2009 RNP complex. Mehle
and Doudna recently proposed an alternate strategy for PB2448 Cell Host & Microbe 7, June 17, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.human adaptation, the so-called ‘‘SR’’ polymorphism, involving
residues 590–591. Both strategies may operate by preserving
a large, positively charged PB2 surface domain, implying that
this region is involved in interactions with undetermined host-
specific factors (Mehle and Doudna, 2008).
Remaining IAV Genes
Much fewer experimental data exist to evaluate the significance
of proposed human-adaptive changes in IAV in the NA-, M-, and
NS-encoded genes. Similarly, mutations associated with host
adaptation in the NS gene are unclear. Although birds have
two NS alleles (A and B), mammalian viruses contain only allele
A, and substitution of an allele A NS with an avian allele B NS
significantly restricted viral replication in nonhuman primates
(Treanor et al., 1989). The NS gene from the 1918 virus has
been reported to be a very potent inhibitor of antiviral and type
I IFN responses in cultured human lung cells (Geiss et al.,
2002), but has >98% identity with NS1 from a number of LPAI
sequences. Moreover, the 1918 NS gene attenuated a lethal
mouse-adapted virus (Basler et al., 2001); yet the 1918 virus is
extremely virulent in mice (Tumpey et al., 2005). Several H5N1
NS1 mutations have been associated with replication and
increased virulence, but their role in host switch is unclear. Seo
et al. reported that increased virulence in pigs of a human
H1N1 virus containing the NS gene of an H5N1 HPAI required
substitution of aspartic acid for glutamine at amino acid 92
(Seo et al., 2002), and this mutation has been associated with
increased resistance to interferon (Lipatov et al., 2005). Addi-
tional mutations have been observed in H5N1 HPAI viruses
that have been associated with increased virulence, but their
significance for host switch to humans remains unclear (Hale
et al., 2008).
Conclusions
Host switch events in IAV, i.e., the formation of pandemic IAVs or
the emergence of novel swine IAVs lineages, have been shown to
be independently evolving polygenic processes. Evolutionary
analyses have demonstrated little evidence of either parallel or
convergent mutations in such events, suggesting a strong role
for historical contingency in the origination of any particular
host switch genotype. Instead, mutations identified as important
in one host switch event may or may not be observed in other
such events, depending on the viral and host genetic context
of each event. The utility of identifying sets of mutations as
proxies to define whether a future IAV is acquiring changes
important in mammalian adaptationmight thus be limited. Future
progress will require a much better understanding of the struc-
ture-function relationship of all the IAV proteins.
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